( This page is in work. )


BURMA DEFENSE
8 December 1941 – 26 May 1942

Less than a week after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, Japanese planes took off from captured bases in Thailand and opened the invasion of Burma by bombing the Tavoy airdrome, a forward British outpost on the Andaman Sea south of Rangoon. The next day, 12 December 1941, small Japanese units began the ground offensive by infiltrating into Burma. Not having prepared for war, Imperial British forces in Burma lacked even such rudimentary necessities as an adequate military intelligence staff. Although a civil defense commissioner had been appointed in November 1941, the British had not made contingency arrangements, such as military control of the railroads and the inland waterways. The only British forces in Burma were a heterogeneous mixture of Burmese, British, and Indian units known as the Army in Burma. Their air support consisted of some sixteen obsolete Royal Air Force (RAF) fighters.

The primary purpose of the Allied efforts in the CBI was to hold the Japanese in check while achieving victory elsewhere. Until late in the war, operations against the enemy on the Asian mainland in the China-Burma-India Theater (CBI), were hindered by a tangled chain of Allied command, the long distance from sources of resupply, and the very low priority of men and material given to the theater.

The only American combat force even remotely available at the onset of the fighting was the fledgling American Volunteer Group (AVG), which would later be nicknamed the "Flying Tigers." The AVG was preparing to provide air support to the Chinese Army against the Japanese in China. They had begun training during the summer of 1941 in Burma to be out of range of Japanese air raids until ready for combat. Chennault had hoped to employ his three squadrons of fighter aircraft, after thorough training, as a single unit in China, but the subsequent Japanese invasion of Burma quickly changed his priorities. In response to a British request for support on 12 December, one squadron of the AVG moved, near Rangoon, to help protect the capital city and its port facilities. The two remaining squadrons deployed to China to protect Chinese cities and patrol the Burma Road.

During the enemy's rapid advance through Burma, Allied combat airpower consisted of a meager force of British RAF units, the AVG, and fewer than a dozen USAAF B-17s and LB-30s (export version of the B-24) assigned to the newly created Tenth AF. A trickle of reinforcements arrived from the U.S. and AAF bombers succeeded in flying a few bombing missions against the enemy, but they were unable to halt the Japanese advance.

As Allied defenses had crumbled in Burma, AAF transport crews aided in the evacuation of personnel and dropped supplies to the remnants of Lt.Gen. Joseph Stilwel's command as they retreated on foot. By mid-May 1942, the Japanese had driven to the borders of India, taking all of Burma and cutting the Burma Road into China. Only the arrival of the monsoon season prevented an invasion of India.



CHINA DEFENSIVE
4 July 1942 – 4 May 1945

The China Air Task Force activated on July 4th, 1942 at which time Brigadier General Chennault's force had an effective strength of about thirty-five P-40's and seven B-25 medium bombers, part of those planned to join up with the Tokyo Raiders. In China, the American Volunteer Group was to be inducted into the AAF's 23rd Fighter Group. However, for various reasons only a handful the personnel agreed to induction in the USAAF. Small in size even by Pacific standards, the China Air Task Force fought against heavy odds defending the Chinese end of the Hump route and supporting the Chinese ground army.

Less than a year later on 10 March 1943 Chennault's Force gained independent status as the Fourteenth Air Force. The scope of 14th Air Force operations would be limited throughout the war by the tonnage of fuel, munitions, and parts which could be carried over 'the Hump.' Shortages of these essentials would, at times, severely restrict 14th AF fighter and medium bomber operations.



AERIAL SUPPLY
April 1942 – Jan 1946

On May 29, 1941, the Army Air Corps created the Ferrying Command to fly aircraft from U.S. factories to Canada and to Atlantic ports for delivery to Great Britain. The command was also to establish air transport service between Washington and Britain. On July 1, 1941, Lt. Col. Caleb V. Haynes inaugurated the first flight in a modified B-24 by way of Newfoundland and soon the command was making regular flights to England. By the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941, the command had delivered approximately 1,350 planes for Britain.

With Maj. Curtis E. LeMay as co-pilot, Haynes began a pioneering 26,000-mile survey trip on Aug. 31, 1941 across the southern Atlantic via Brazil from the U.S. to the Middle East and back. Projects also were begun in 1941 to build airbases along a southern flight corridor from the U.S. to Australia. Regular service along this route began in 1942.

FLYING the HUMP

Across this treacherous route the AAF undertook and maintained the aerial resupply of China in the greatest sustained aerial transport achievement of the war, carrying cargoes ranging from bombs, gasoline, and medicine to spare parts, trucks, and K-rations.

Ferrying Command aircraft displayed American flag markings to indicate neutrality prior to U.S. entry into WWII in 1941. The CBI had fewer than a dozen such B-24s converted to carrying cargo and passengers, plus 40 to 50 twin-engine transports.

On June 20, 1942, the Ferrying Command became the Air Transport Command (ATC) with world-wide responsibility for ferrying aircraft; transporting personnel, materiel, and mail; and maintaining air route facilities outside of the U.S.

The India-China Ferry came under the control of AAF's Air Transport Command (ATC) on December 1, 1942, redesignated "India-China Wing" of the ATC. Slowly the organization increased its lift over the Hump from 2,800 tons in February 1943 to more than 12,000 tons a month in early 1944 and 71,000 tons in July 1945. Although the Hump operation cost the lives of some 800 flyers, it kept China in the war.

The USAAF responded to the requirement to keep China engaged against Japan by conducting two distinct air supply operations, a tactical air supply mission to Burma and a strategic air supply effort over the Himalayas to China. The tactical air supply effort to Burma supported offensive combat operations and the construction of the Ledo Road, while the Hump airlift directly contributed to the American strategic objective. Despite Stilwell’s stubborn commitment to the Ledo Road as the main effort to supply the Chinese and to the necessary use of tactical air supply to support this and other ground operations in Burma, the key contribution to the success of keeping China in the war against Japan was ultimately the strategic air supply missions over the Hump.

Maj Adrian R. Byers, USAF AIR SUPPLY OPERATIONS IN THE CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER BETWEEN 1942 AND 1945